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This Comment argues that, in cases where a government that the executive branch has not for-
mally recognized seeks access to a U.S. court, the court should defer to executive branch judgment.
Part I of this Comment reviews the development of the case law on foreign governments binging
suit in U.S. courts. Part II discusses the Second Circuit’s decision in National Petrochemical Co.
of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf. Part III argues that determination of court access for a government
not recognized formally by the United States is an executive branch function and should not be
replaced by a court analysis of contracts between a foreign government and the United States. The
Comment concludes that an executive branch statement of interest [. . .] best represents executive
branch willingness to allow foreign government to bring suit in a U.S. court.
COMMENT
UNRECOGNIZED FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COURT
ACCESS AFTER NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL
CO. OF IRAN v. THE M/T STOLT SHEAF
INTRODUCTION
U.S. courts have extended access only to recognized for-
eign governments.' Courts have looked for a formal statement
of recognition by the executive branch to determine when a
foreign government was entitled to bring suit.2 The executive
branch, however, currently does not see the need to recognize
new governments because such recognition is often seen as an
announcement of approval of the recognized government and
of its conduct.3 Because the executive branch no longer articu-
lates the recognition of new governments, no matter how es-
tablished,. courts may run into difficulty in determining when
foreign governments can sue in U.S. courts. This was the case
in National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf,4
1. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (only govern-
ments recognized by and at peace with United States are entitled to access to U.S.
courts); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (suit may be main-
tained only by government that has been recognized by political department of U.S.
government as authorized government of foreign state); The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (1
Wall.) 164 (1870) (French Emperor as legitimate successor to prior French govern-
ment recognized by U.S. government, may maintain suit in U.S. court); King of Spain
v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 7,814) (court refused to determine if
King of Spain, not having been recognized as King by the U.S. government, may
maintain suit in U.S. court); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16,
99th Cong., I st Sess. 564-67 (1987) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS AND INTER-
PRETATION]. This privilege does not apply to a recognized government with which we
are at war. See Ex Parte Don Ascanio Colonna, 314 U.S. 510 (1942); Caperton v.
Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 236 (1871); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532,
536 (1867); Pang-Tsu Mow v. China, 201 F.2d 195, 198-99 (1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 925 (1953); Trading with the Enemy Act, § 7, 50 U.S.C. app. § i (1982).
2. See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
3. Diplomatic Recognition A Foreign Relations Outline, 77 DEP'T ST. BULL. 462-63
(1977) (in recent years United States has avoided use of recognition in cases of
changes of governments and concerned itself with question of whether it wanted to
have diplomatic relations with new government); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 reporter's note 1 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
4. 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
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where, the executive branch declined to recognize formally the
Khomeini government, and the court looked at that govern-
ment's contacts with the United States to determine whether to
grant it access to U.S. courts.5
This Comment argues that, in cases where a government
that the executive branch has not formally recognized seeks ac-
cess to a U.S. court, the court should defer to executive branch
judgment. Part I of this Comment reviews the development of
the case law on foreign governments bringing suit in U.S.
courts. Part II discusses the Second Circuit's decision in Na-
tional Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf. Part III
argues that determination of court access for a government not
recognized formally by the United States is an executive
branch function and should not be replaced by a court analysis
of contacts between a foreign government and the United
States. This Comment concludes that an executive branch
statement of interest ("Statement of Interest") best represents
executive branch willingness to allow a foreign government to
bring suit in a U.S. court.
I. RECOGNITION AS A PREREQUISITE TO SUIT BY A
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
In the United States, only those foreign governments that
have been formally recognized6 by the executive branch can
5. See infra note 159-66 and accompanying text.
6. The concept of recognition of foreign states and their governments devel-
oped from the political doctrines of the European monarchies and the rise of the
modern nation-state. L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 13 (1978).
During the late Middle Ages, the concept of legitimacy provided that the only legiti-
mate ruler was the king, as he was the "chosen of God." Id. at 13. The concept later
developed to provide that the only legitimate government was one that came to
power in compliance with the established legal order of the state. Id. Using this
theory as a basis, following the French Revolution, European monarchies banded
together and agreed not to recognize governments created in open revolt. Id. This
formed the basis for recognition practices. Id.
There are three major approaches to recognition of a foreign government.
The first is the modern approach, which looks at the following:
a. Whether the government is in de facto control of the territory and in posses-
sion of the machinery of the State;
b. Whether the government has the consent of the people, without substantial
resistance to its administration, that is, whether there is public acquiesence to the
authority of the government; and
c. Whether the new government has indicated its willingness to comply with its
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bring suit in U.S. courts. 7 The executive'branch is the sole
branch of the government entrusted with the power to decide
whether or not to recognize a foreign government. This
obligations under treaties and international law. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 72-73 (1963).
The second approach, the Estrada Doctrine, enunciated by Mexican Foreign
Minister Don Genaro Estrada in 1930, rejects the concept that one state or govern-
ment can pass judgment on another by granting or withholding recognition. The
doctrine considers such judgment an insult and instead concentrates on the mainte-
nance or withdrawal of diplomatic relations. The doctrine was the result of a post-
World War I policy that saw express declarations of recognition in the case of gov-
ernmental change in Latin American countries, but no similar grants of recognition
upon governmental change in European countries. L. GALLOWAY, supra, at 8-10. The
doctrine is reprinted in 25 AM.J. OF INT'L L. Supp. 203 (1931).
Third is the Tobar Doctrine, which requires that a government that comes to
power through extraconstitutional means hold a free election and elect new leaders
before recognition will be granted. This doctrine has had little acceptance. L. GAL-
LOWAY, supra, at 10.
7. See supra note 1. The jurisdictional basis of diversity suits in federal courts is
28 U.S.C. § 1332, which provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between . . . a foreign state, defined in
section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. 100-702, tit. II, §§ 201, 203, 102 Stat.
4646 (1988).
A "foreign state" is defined as "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a) (1982). Subsection (b) defines an agency or instrumentality as any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is'owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3. The President has the power to make treaties and
appoint ambassadors with Senate approval and advice. Id. The Senate's role does
not diminish the President's power, because the President has the sole ability to initi-
ate these actions. J. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 19-21 (1928). Article II, § 3 gives the President the power to receive ambassa-
dors. U.S. CONST. art 11, § 3; see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 3, § 204 (President
under Constitution has exclusive authority to recognize or not recognize foreign gov-
ernments). See generally CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at
561 (assessing history of executive branch's foreign affairs powers). The executive's
foreign affairs powers have been upheld in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (in international relations, President is sole organ of fed-
eral government); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) (determination of
whether an island is part of United States is foreign relations question and, therefore,
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power derives from the executive's constitutionally-delegated
foreign affairs powers.9 The executive branch considers many
factors in making its recognition decision, including whether
the government to be recognized is in actual control of the
state, whether it represents the will of the people, and whether
the government to be recognized is willing to honor its inter-
national obligations.' Recognition has been withheld and
court access has been denied where the executive branch has
strictly executive power); and Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (as party constitutionally charged with responsibility of
maintaining diplomatic relations, President had full authority to recognize People's
Republic of China and to derecognize Taiwan).
9. See Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (within exclusive power of execu-
tive branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue); National City Bank of
N.Y. v. China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (status of government of Republic of China in our
courts is for executive determination); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.
126 (1938) (what government is to be recognized as representative of foreign coun-
try is political question, to be determined by political department); United States v.
Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501) (courts must follow decision
of executive as to which government is recognized); CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS AND IN-
TERPRETATION, supra note I, at 564-67. Recognition of a foreign government is not
compulsory. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 3, § 203. However, until recognition, a
state of government exists, but only as to its citizens, not as to the rest of the world.
SeeJ. HERVEY, supra note 8, at 8-9. One commentator has suggested that recognition
of a government is a legal decision and is not left to the recognizing state's discre-
tion. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-97 (1947).
10. See L. GALLOWAY, supra note 6, at 14-15, 21. Thomas Jefferson initially ex-
pressed U.S. recognition policy in 1792, upon the fall of the French monarchy. His
instructions to the U.S. ambassador in France became the foundation of early U.S.
recognition policy. Id. at 14-15. Under Jefferson's test, recognition was granted,
whatever the government's origin, on the basis of two criteria. Id. First, the govern-
ment to be recognized should be in actual control of the entire governmental author-
ity, and second, the government to be recognized should represent the will of the
nation, substantially declared. Id.; see 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 6, at 68-69.
The first factor was stressed by the executive branch in an assumption that acqui-
escence of the people to a government's control meant that the second factor, the
will of the people, was being served. See L. GALLOWAY, supra note 6, at 15. Other
factors were considered by subsequent administrations, such as whether the govern-
ment was willing to fulfill international obligations, whether the government was sta-
ble, whether the government truly represented the people's will, and whether free
elections would be held. Id. at 17-29; M. WHITEMAN, supra note 6, at 69, 72-73.
There are several modes of recognition. J. HERVEY, supra note 8, at 18-19. Rec-
ognition may arise from a bilateral treaty entered into for that purpose, by a stipula-
tion in a treaty entered into for other purposes, or by exchange of diplomatic agents.
Id.; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 371-83. There are also limited situations where
recognition may be implied. Id. at 405-06. However, implication of recognition
should only occur where there is clear evidence of a state's intenf to grant such rec-
ognition. Id.
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not found such factors." Until the executive branch has rec-
ognized a new government, the courts cannot recognize the
existence of that new government. 12
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,'3
recognition and, therefore, court access required the existence
of friendly relations between governments.' 4 The Supreme
Court rejected this friendship requirement in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino,' 5 stating that, because a court is unable to
assess levels of friendship, the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions without a withdrawal of recognition does not preclude
court access for that government.' 6 After Sabbatino, courts
have generally followed a no-recognition no-access policy, de-
veloping at the same time exceptions that would allow entities
controlled and created by the unrecognized governments to
sue when incorporated in the United States, or otherwise hav-
11. See, e.g., The Hornet, 12 F. Cas. 529 (C.C.N.C. 1870) (No. 6,705) (U.S. courts
cannot recognize new government or admit its agents or representatives as parties
with standing in judicial actions until executive has publicly recognized that new gov-
ernment); see also, Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub non. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); The Penza, 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y.
1921); The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1920); The Rogday, 279 F. 130 (N.D. Cal.
1920); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
12. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (courts
cannot recognize Soviet government until political branch grants such recognition);
United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501) (recognition
is political question and court must follow executive and legislative branch decision);
Cibrario, 235 N.Y. at 255, 139 N.E. at 259 (Soviet government cannot bring suit in
U.S. court until recognized by executive and legislative branch).
[Recognition] involves the determination of great public and political ques-
tions, which belong to the departments of our government that have charge
of our foreign relations,-the legislative and executive departments. When
those questions are decided by those departments, the courts follow the de-
cision, and, until those departments have recognized the existence of the
new government, the courts of the nation cannot .... This has been the
uniform course of decision and practice of the courts of the United States.
United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962, 966 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501); see
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 3, § 204 (President's actions in recognizing or not
recognizing a foreign government are binding on courts). This was clarified in later
cases, where it was stated that the executive makes the recognition decision. See
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
13. 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
14. Id. at 258-59, 139 N.E. at 260.
15. 376 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. Id. at 410.
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ing standing to sue, or when there was a Statement of Interest
filed by the executive branch.' v Exceptions to this policy have
been developed enabling entities controlled or created by the
unrecognized governments to sue, although the governments
themselves have not been allowed to maintain suit.' 8 In the
recent case of Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair,'9 a state-
owned corporation formed under the laws of an unrecognized
government was given U.S.-court access based on a Statement
of Interest filed by the executive branch.20
A. Cibrario: Friendship as an Incident of Recognition
In 1917, the executive branch recognized the provisional
Russian government. 21 Later that year, the Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic (the "Soviet government") took
control from the provisional government.2 2 The executive
branch, however, continued to recognize the provisional Rus-
sian government and its representatives in the United States as
the official Russian government. 23 This situation continued
until the United States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in 1933.24
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,25 the
17. See, e.g., Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977); Federal Repub-
lic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Kunst-
sammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974); see infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
19. 544 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982).
20. Id. at 863-64.
21. Telegram from Ambassador Francis to the U.S. Secretary of State Robert
Lansing (Mar. 26, 1917) (State Dep't File No. 861.00/296) (informing Secretary of
State of acceptance of U.S. recognition of provisional government), reprinted in DEP'T
OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1211 (1917).
22. See R. BROWDER, THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 3-5 (1953).
23. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 130 (1938); H. LAU-
TERPACHT, supra note 9, at 352.
24. See Circular Telegram from William Phillips, Acting U.S. Secretary of State,
to All Diplomatic Missions Abroad (Nov. 17, 1933) (State Dep't File No.
711.61/365a) (informing U.S. missions abroad of according of recognition to Soviet
government), reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE, 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES 816 (1933). See generally R. BROWDER, supra note 22, at 127-35 (discussing
recognition of Soviet government).
25. 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923). Other cases arising out of the nonrecog-
nition of the Soviet government include: Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. at 126 (while
Soviet government was not recognized by United States from 1917-1933, provisional
government was recognized and had standing to sue on Russian claims); The Penza,
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Soviet government brought suit in the United States to recover
funds in the hands of its U.S. purchasing agents.26 The Soviet
government claimed that it had standing to bring suit, because
it was the de facto government of Russia.27 The respondent
disputed the Soviet government's claim, maintaining that lack
of recognition by the executive branch precluded the Soviet
government from maintaining suit.2 8 The New York Court of
Appeals held that foreign sovereigns do not sue in U.S. courts
as a matter of right, but rather as a matter of comity.29 The
court defined comity as a reciprocal courtesy that exists be-
tween friendly nations.30 One aspect of such courtesy is the
right to sue in the courts of another nation.3 ' The extension of
comity is not within the discretion of the courts, because it is
the comity of the nation, and not of the court, that is en-
forced. 2 Further, comity is subject to public policy, which may
be interpreted by the courts but is fixed by the other branches
of government. 3  Consequently, the courts only enforce for-
277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) (court is bound to recognize only those governments rec-
ognized by executive); The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D.C. 1920) (court will not take
property of recognized provisional Russian government and award it to unrecog-
nized Soviet government). For a discussion of the denial of access to the Soviet Re-
public, see L.JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 140-98 (1933); Dickin-
son, Recognition Cases 1925-1930, 25 AM.J. INT'L L. 214 (1931); Dickinson, Recent Rec-
ognition Cases, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 263 (1925); Tennant, Recognition Cases in American
Courts, 1923-1930, 29 MICH. L. REV. 708 (1931); Comment, Can an Unrecognized Gov-
ernment Sue?, 31 YALE L.J. 534 (1922).
26. Russian Socialist Federated Republic v. Cibrario, 198 A.D. 869, 870, 191
N.Y.S. 543, 544 (App. Div. 1921).
27. Id. at 871-72, 191 N.Y.S. 544-45.
28. Id. at 871, 191 N.Y.S. 545.
29. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. at 262, 139 N.E. at 262.
We reach the conclusion, therefore, that a foreign power brings an action in
our courts not as a matter of right. Its power to do so is the creature of
comity. Until stch government is recognized by the United States, no such
comity exists. The plaintiff concededly has not been so recognized. There
is, therefore, no proper party before us.
Id.
30. Id. at 258, 139 N.E. at 260. The court quoted Webster's dictionary defini-
tion of comity. Webster's defines comity as, "in general terms that there are between
nations at peace with one another rights both national and individual resulting from
the comity or courtesy due from one friendly nation to another. Among these is the
right to sue in their courts respectively." Id. at 258-59, 139 N.E. at 260 (quoting 6
WEBSTER WORKS 117). "[Comity] presupposes friendship. It assumes the prevalence
of equity and justice." Id. at 258, 139 N.E. at 260.
31. Id. at 258-59, 139 N.E. at 260.
32. Id. at 259, 139 N.E. at 260.
33. Id. "This rule is always subject, however, to one consideration. There may
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eign policy and do not determine it.34 In the absence of formal
recognition by the U.S. government, no such comity exists that
would permit suit.3 5
The court stated that it found no cases where unrecog-
nized governments were granted access to U.S. courts. 36 The
court further stated that this is because comity cannot exist un-
til a government is recognized.3 7 Such recognition and, there-
fore, comity are political questions and the courts are bound
by the branches of government in charge of those decisions.3 8
The court concluded that the Soviet government could not
maintain suit, because the branches of the U.S. government re-
sponsible for granting recognition had not recognized that
government. 9
B. Sabbatino: Court Access After a Break in Diplomatic
Relations-Friendly Relations Not Required
When the regime of Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba
in 1959, the United States recognized the new government
quickly and expressed a willingness to pursue relations.4 0 On
be no yielding, if to yield is inconsistent with our public policy." Id. The court refers
to recognition as fixed by the "other" branches of government. Id. This was clarified
in later cases to mean the executive branch. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
34. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. at 262, 139 N.E. at 262.
We may add that recognition and consequently the existence of comity is
purely a matter for the determination of the legislative or executive depart-
ments of the government. Who is the sovereign of a territory is a political
question. In any case where that question is in dispute the courts are bound
by the decision reached by those departments.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 260, 139 N.E. at 261.
37. Id. at 262, 139 N.E. at 262.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court stated that the relations of the United States with the Russian
government were such that court access might be denied even if comity did not de-
pend on recognition. Id. at 263, 139 N.E. at 262. In making this statement, the court
cited explicit executive policy supporting a denial of court access. Id. The court
pointed out executive statements critical of Soviet actions, such as the Soviet refusal
to observe agreements with other nations, Soviet intent to promote revolt in other
nations, and oppression of the Russian people. Id. at 263-65, 139 N.E. at 262-63.
Additionally, the court cited the questionable nature of a policy that would allow a
government with which the United States has bad relations to sue in the United
States in order to recover funds that could be used to strengthen that government.
Id. at 263, 139 N.E. at 262.
40. DEP'T OF STATE, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH CONG., IST
SESS., EVENTS IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS 1, 3 (Comm. Print 1963) (Castro
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January 3, 1961, however, the United States severed diplo-
matic relations with Cuba as a result of increasing Cuban rela-
tions with the Soviet government and economic actions against
U.S. interests in Cuba.4' After the severance of diplomatic re-
lations, the Cuban government brought suit in U.S. courts.4 2
Defendants in these suits sought dismissal on the theory that
the severance of diplomatic relations signalled the withdrawal
of recognition. 43 U.S. courts faced with a recognized govern-
ment with which the United States does not have diplomatic
relations rendered inconsistent court decisions as to whether
Cuba could bring suit.44
proclaimed the provisional government on January 2, and the United States recog-
nized it on January 7).
41. Id. at 19.
42. See, e.g., P & E Shipping Corp. v. Empressa Cubana Exportadora e Im-
portadora de Alimentos, 335 F.2d 678 (Ist Cir. 1964) (action for failure to deliver
shipment to Cuba); Pons v. Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
960 (1962) (action for money taken by Cuban national from Republic of Cuba); Rich
v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (libel against vessel and its cargo);
Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe, 199 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1961)
(action for possession of vessel); Cuba v. Mayan Lines, 145 So. 2d 679 (La. Ct. App.
1962) (action for possession of vessel).
43. See, e.g., The MIT Mar Caribe, 199 F. Supp. at 873 (defendant claiming arm
of Cuban government, due to breach in diplomatic relations, cannot maintain suit in
U.S. court); Mayan Lines, 145 So. 2d at 682 (appellee claiming dissolving of relations
between United States and Cuba precludes suit by Cuban government). In P & E
Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (1st Cir.
1962), the court raised, sua sponte, the issue of severance of diplomatic relations
precluding access to U.S. courts. Id. at 417.
44. In some cases, the issue of whether severing diplomatic relations is the same
as withdrawing of recognition was not addressed at all and suits were allowed to
proceed. See, e.g., Pons, 294 F.2d at 925; Rich, 295 F.2d at 24. In one case, where suit
was initiated prior to the severance of diplomatic relations, the action was suspended
until diplomatic relations resumed. The M/T Mar Caribe, 199 F. Supp. at 874. Prior
to the Cuban situation, courts had suspended suits that had been initiated prior to a
break in diplomatic relations. See, e.g., China v. Merchant Fire Assurance Corp., 30
F.2d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1929); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,
92 F. Supp. 920, 924 (N.D. Cal. 1950), appeal dismissed, 190 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1951);
France v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631, 633-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). In an-
other case involving Cuba, the court viewed diplomatic relations as distinct from rec-
ognition, and suit was allowed to continue on the theory that the United States still
recognized Cuba. Mayan Lines, 145 So. 2d at 683. In yet another case, the court
sought the input of the executive branch as to Cuban-U.S. relations, and the reci-
procity of Cuban courts for the pursuit of similar actions by the United States. P & E
Shipping Corp., 307 F.2d at 418. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Sabbatino,
376 U.S 398 (1964), during the period P & E Shipping Corp. was on remand. Conse-
quently, the court of appeals granted access to Cuba in P & E Shipping Corp. on the
basis of the Sabbatino decision as well as the district court's determination on remand
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The Supreme Court resolved this controversy in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.4 5 The Court restated the proposi-
tion, stated in Cibrario, that sovereign states sue in U.S. courts
under principles of comity. 46 While courts have equated com-
ity with friendly relations between states,4 7 the Court stated
that in practice, access to U.S. courts has only been denied to
governments either at war with the United States or not recog-
nized by the United States. 48 The respondents, relying on the
reasoning of Cibrario, claimed that the unfriendliness of U.S.-
Cuban relations indicated a lack of comity, and, therefore,
court access should be denied.49 The respondents equated
breaking off of diplomatic relations with a withdrawal of recog-
nition. 50 The petitioner argued that there are no degrees of
recognition or friendliness and that if recognition exists, court
access should be granted.5'
The Court in Sabbatino distinguished recognition and com-
ity from diplomatic relations.52 While severance of diplomatic
relations and nonrecognition may reflect similar feelings of un-
friendliness, 3 the Court stated that nonrecognition has a
that recognition of Cuba continued. P & E Shipping Corp., 335 F.2d at 679; see infra
notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
45. 376 U.S 398 (1963). This action was brought by the Cuban government for
conversion of bills of lading. The Court stated that the issue of the denial of access
to Cuba had been raised for the first time on this appeal. Nevertheless, closing of
courts to the government of a foreign state is an issue that transcends the interests of
the parties, therefore, the Court would have raised it sua sponte. Id. at 408.
46. Id. at 408-09.
47. See Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255,
139 N.E. 259 (1923). "Comity may be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one
member of the family of nations owes to the others. It presupposes friendship." Id.
at 258, 139 N.E. at 260; see also, Bank of Augusta v. Earle 38 U.S. (13 Pet) 519, 589
(1839), overruled on other grounds by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945).
48. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409. For cases denying access to unrecognized gov-
ernments and to governments with which the United States is at war, see supra note
11.
49. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410; Brief for Respondent Farr, Whitlock & Co. at 13-
18, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (No. 16) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent].
50. Brief for Respondent, supra note 49, at 18.
51. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964) (No. 16) [hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Briefi.
52. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410-11.
53. Id. at 411. In fact, it is quite possible that a government could have better
relations with a government that it has not recognized than with a government that it
has recognized, but with which diplomatic relations have been broken. For example,
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unique legal aspect.54 Nonrecognition signifies that the United
States is unwilling to accept the unrecognized government as
speaking for the people it purports to control.55
The unpredictable nature of diplomatic relations, how-
ever, makes it a poor basis for determining court access. 6 The
Court stated that courts are not competent to assess degrees of
friendliness or lack of friendliness.57 Absent a declaration of
war, which is a clear statement of unfriendly relations, a recog-
nized sovereign has access to U.S. courts regardless of the
level of diplomatic relations with that sovereign.58
The Court further noted that recognition is a political
question and exclusively an executive function. 59 The Court
added that allowing suit in the case of nonrecognition may re-
the United States recognized the government of Cuba, but maintained no diplomatic
relations with that government and imposed major restrictions on trade with Cuba.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9 6 TH
CONG., IST SESS., REPORTS SUBMITrED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1979, at 1, 168 (Jt. Comm. Print 1979)
[hereinafter JOINT REPORT]. However, the United States does not recognize Angola,
id. at 167, but carries on significant trade relationships with that country. See Trans-
portes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, 544 F. Supp. 858, 861 (D. Del. 1982) (State Dep't
letter written for case states that US$638.6 million annual trade between Angola and
United States makes United States one of Angola's largest trading partners). A simi-
lar situation of extensive relations with an unrecognized government can be found in
U.S.-China relations during the early 1970s. See L. GALLOWAY, supra note 6, at 11.
54. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410.
55. Id. On the issue of the government speaking for the people it purports to
control, see H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 124-36.
56. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410; Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 51, at 3.
Within recent months we have witnessed statements from the Executive
Branch critical of numerous countries: France, the Soviet Union, Haiti, and
South Vietnam, among others. Yet such attitudes can, and frequently do,
shift drastically as the exigencies of the situation demand. No court could
assume the burden of deciding, on the basis of such Executive statements,
whether, at any moment, any particular state is so unfriendly as to be denied
access to our courts.
Id.
57. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410. "This Court would hardly be competent to un-
dertake assessments of varying degrees of friendliness or its absence ..... Id.
58. Id.
[W]e are constrained to consider any relationship, short of war, with a rec-
ognized sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United
States courts. . . . Severance may take place for any number of political
reasons, its duration is unpredictable, and whatever expression of animosity
it may imply does not approach that implicit in a declaration of war.
Id.
59. Id.; see supra note 8.
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suit in judicial-executive conflict, with the judiciary infringing
on the executive's foreign affairs powers. 60 The severing of
diplomatic relations alone does not reach a similar result.6'
This is because the executive branch has already stated that the
government bringing suit is recognized and able to speak for
the people it purports to control.62
Thus, in Sabbatino the Supreme Court modified Cibrario.63
While foreign governments bring suit under principles of com-
ity, courts do not look to the existence of diplomatic relations
or friendship in determining court access. 64 The executive
branch's recognition of a foreign government is the basis for
bringing suit.6 5 Because the United States had recognized the
Castro regime and did not de-recognize it, the break in diplo-
matic relations did not prevent Cuba from bringing suit.6 6
C. Applying Sabbatino
In subsequent suits involving the governments of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic ("East Germany" or the "GDR")
and the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. courts continued to require
recognition for court access. In Federal Republic of Germany v.
Elicofon,6 7 the Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany")
sought to recover paintings stolen during World War 11.68 The
60. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410-11. For an argument that judicial-executive con-
flict will not result in all instances where an unrecognized government is allowed to
bring suit, see the discussion of Cibrario in L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 149-56.
61. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410-11.
62. Id. at 411. The absence of any executive-judicial conflict is supported by the
filing of an amicus curiae brief by the executive branch in support of Cuba's act-of-
state claim in the litigation, which supports a conclusion that granting of court access
would not frustrate executive policy. Id.
63. In doing so, the Court noted that the doctrine that nonrecognition pre-
cludes suit by a foreign government in all instances has been the subject of criticism.
Id. n. 12. However, the issue was not before the Court and it declined to discuss such
a possibility. Id.
64. See id. at 410-11. Contra Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v.
Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258-59, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923).
65. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410-11.
66. See id.
67. 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Kunstsammlungen zu Wei-
mar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974).
68. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 749. See Recent Decisions, Foreign Relations Law-
Standing to Sue-Veimar Art Collection Denied Standing to Intervene Because It is an Agency of
the German Democratic Republic, an Unrecognized Government, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
213 (1973) (discussing the Elicofon decision).
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Weimar Art Collection (the "Collection"), a legal entity of East
Germany, sought to intervene in the action, claiming owner-
ship of the paintings at the time of the theft.69 The United
States, however, did not recognize the GDR. 70 Thus, the Col-
lection tried to avoid the rule against court access for unrecog-
nized governments by claiming it was not an arm of the GDR. 7 1
The district court stated that the Supreme Court's analysis
in Sabbatino, that nonrecognition manifests an unwillingness to
acknowledge that a government speaks for the people it claims
to control, supported denial of access to the GDR. 72 The court
held, therefore, that the GDR, as an unrecognized govern-
ment, had no standing to bring suit.73 The court further stated
that the Collection would similarly lack standing if it was an
arm or instrumentality of the GDR.7 1 In a supplemental opin-
ion the court found that the Collection was an arm of the
GDR. 75  Thus, the Collection was denied access to U.S.
69. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 749. In a similar situation, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus sought permission to intervene in a suit to determine the owner-
ship of four mosaics claimed to have been stolen from Cyprus. Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., No. 89-
304-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 1989) (WESTLAW, Fed. library, Allfeds file). The United
States recognizes the Republic of Cyprus, and not the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, as the government of Cyprus. Id. Judge James E. Nolan, of the Federal Dis-
trict Court of Indianapolis, denied the motion of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus on the grounds that it is not recognized by the United States. Id. at 51. See
Honan, Trial to Decide Owner of iMosaics Begins, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1989, at C 15, col.
1.
70. Id. at 750. The Justice Department, acting on behalf of the State Depart-
ment, filed a Suggestion of Interest that stated:
1. The United States Government does not recognize the East German re-
gime.
2. The United Slates Government recognizes the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as the only German Government entitled to speak for Germany as the
representative of the German people in international affairs.
3. The United States Government recognizes the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as entitled in this litigation to represent the Weimar Museum as
trustee of-its interests.
Id.
71. Id. For a discussion of the separate juridical entity exception, allowing enti-
ties formed by, but separate from, an unrecognized government to bring suit, see
infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
72. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 752. The court stated that the Sabbatino case called
for a re-examination of the court access issue, and determined that Sabbatino held that
only recognized governments could sue in U.S. courts. Id.
73. Id. at 753.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 756. The court found that the GDR's designation of the Weimar Art
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courts.7 6
In Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc.,7 the government of the Republic
of Vietnam filed suit against the Pfizer drug company for al-
leged antitrust violations.78 During the course of the action,
the Republic of Vietnam surrendered unconditionally to the
forces of North Vietnam, which formed the new state of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 79 The executive branch did not
recognize the new state or a new government as the sovereign
of the territory formerly known as the Republic of Vietnam.80
The court dismissed the suit against Pfizer and held that the
Republic of Vietnam had ceased to exist and no new govern-
ment was recognized by the United States as the sovereign au-
thority in that territory.8
Collection as a juristic personality was specifically done to avoid the rule denying
court access to unrecognized governments. Id.
76. Id. at 757. The court's decision was a move away from the reasoning of
Upright v. Mercury Business Machs., 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div.
1961), which suggested that an entity separate from an unrecognized government,
yet owned by that government, may have access to U.S. courts. See Lubman, Unrecog-
nized Governments in American Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 275, 305 (1962) (suggesting that permitting suit by entity of unrecog-
nized government does not contravene any executive policy). For discussion of sepa-
rate entities, see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
In 1974, the United States recognized the GDR, and the Weimar Art Collection
was permitted to intervene in the suit for the possession of the paintings. See Kunst-
sammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977).
78. Id. at 893.
79. Id. This formed a new state, not just a new government. See Esper, Commu-
nists Take Over Saigon; U.S. Rescue Fleet is Picking up Vietnamese Who Fled in Boats, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1975, at A1, col. 8 (on surrender of South Vietnam).
80. Pfizer, 556 F.2d at 894. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976), a letter from the State Department, in response to an
inquiry as to the status of South Vietnam, stated that the U.S. government recognized
no government of South Vietnam. Id. at 613 n.3. Seeing no probable change in the
near future, the State Department recommended dismissal of the suit rather than
suspension. Id. There have been cases where suit has been suspended until a change
in relations occurs. See, e.g., Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe, 199 F.
Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1961) (opting to suspend suit during period of breaking off of
diplomatic relations with Cuba until relations normalized); France v. Isbrandtsen-
Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (suit suspended while state of war ex-
isted).
81. Pfizer, 556 F.2d at 895; Today Show: Interview with Secretary Kissinger (NBC tele-
vision broadcast, May 5-8, 1975) (transcript reprinted in 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 665, 667
(1975)) (United States cannot recognize the Vietnamese government until United
States observes its conduct); Public Broadcasting System: Interview with [President] Ford
(PBS television broadcast, Aug. 7, 1975) (transcript reprinted in 73 DEP'T ST. BULL.
377, 379 (1975)) ("[Vietnam's] current actions certainly do not convince me that we
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D. Exceptions to Non-Access for Unrecognized Governments
Two exceptions have developed to the requirement that a
government must be recognized to' maintain suit in U.S.
courts. In Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States,8 2 the court de-
veloped the separate juridical entity exception.8" This excep-
tion, also known as the corporate exception, allows entities
owned by unrecognized governments to have access to U.S.
courts if the entity is sufficiently independent of the govern-
ment. 84 The exception was employed to enable a New York
corporation fully owned by the unrecognized Soviet Russian
government to bring suit in U.S. courts, because the corpora-
tion was incorporated in New York and, therefore, was a New
York citizen, regardless of the identity of its stockholders.8 5 In
Elicofon, the court rejected the corporate exception because it
determined that the Weimar Art Collection was not a separate
juridical entity.86
The second exception, which developed after the Civil
War, is the de facto exception.87 It was first proposed in United
should recognize South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam."). On the U.S. refusal to rec-
ognize the new Vietnamese government, see Seoul Bid Loses in U.N. 's Council, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 7, 1975, at A6, col. 1.
82. 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
83. Id. at 528-29. This exception, while it has been mentioned in several federal
court decisions, has not actually been applied positively by any federal courts in an
instance where the separate entity is a corporation or other entity existing in the
unrecognized state, as opposed to a corporation formed under the laws of the United
States. This is because the entities have failed to meet the test's requirements. See
Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, 544 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1982); Ger-
many v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nor. Kunstsam-
mlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974).
84. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 753.
85. Amtorg, 71 F.2d at 528-29. The court held that the case was a legal proceed-
ing and, therefore, the court was not concerned with stock ownership or the stock-
holder's residence. Id. at 528. "In the case before us, the suitor is a corporation and,
as such, is in all legal aspects, a citizen of the state of New York." Id. at 529. The
court relied on other cases where the appellant was allowed to bring suit even though
the courts were aware of the status of East Germany and the corporation's stock. Id.;
see Amtorg Trading Corp. v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 256 N.Y. 671, 177 N.E. 187 (1930),
aff'd without opinion, 229 A.D. 772, 242 N.Y.S. 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930); see also Am-
torg Trading Corp. v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 65 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir. 1933)
(not commenting on unrecognized status of East Germany, but knew of it and al-
lowed suit to proceed).
86. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 752-53, 756.
87. De facto recognition is a form of recognition that is provisional and evi-
dences the existence of some question as to the stability of the regime being recog-
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States v. Insurance Cos.,88 where the Supreme Court held that a
corporation formed by the Confederate Georgia legislature
had standing to sue. 89 The Court held that the Georgia legisla-
ture was not recognized dejure, but it had a de facto existence
and its acts should be given effect if they did not further rebel-
lion and were necessary to peace and good order. °0
The de facto exception was again utilized in Upright v. Mer-
cury Business Mach. Co. 9' The court had to determine whether
the assignee of a debt owed to the unrecognized government
of East Germany could bring suit in a U.S. court.92 The de-
fendant claimed that non-recognition of East Germany pre-
cluded suit by its assignee in U.S. courts.93
The court noted that an unrecognized government may
have a de facto existence that is legally cognizable. 94 The court
did not deem the nonrecognition of the East German govern-
ment as determinative of whether the transaction would be de-
nied enforcement in U.S. courts, so long as the government
itself was not the suitor. 5 The court stated that the East Ger-
man government itself could not sue, because that would be
against the policy of the executive not to recognize legally that
government. 96 An assignee, however, may maintain suit on the
underlying transaction, unless it or the assignment violates na-
nized. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 75 (5th ed. 1967).
De facto recognition has been held to preclude suit by the unrecognized de facto
government on the basis that lack of diplomatic recognition, even if de facto recogni-
tion exists, precludes access to U.S. courts. See Lubman, supra note 76, at, 298.
88. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
89. Id. at 104.
90. Id. at 102-03.
91. 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961). For an analysis of
this case, see Lubman, supra note 76.
92. Upright, 13 A.D.2d at 37, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
93. Id. at 39, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
94. Id. at 38, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
95. Id. at 39, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The court noted that to allow the govern-
ment itself to sue would be recognition of legal status, but allowing a corporate in-
strumentality of that government to sue may not be. Id. at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Steuer stated that an unrecognized government
lacks the capacity to sue, as does a branch or arm of that government. Id. at 42, 213
N.Y.S.2d at 424 (Steuer, J., concurring). Any entity that performs governmental
functions is a branch of an unrecognized government, including corporations. Id.
The State Department makes the determination of whether a particular corporation
is an entity of a government, as such a determination is a political question. Id.
96. Id. at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23.
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tional or public policy. 97
The corporate and de facto exceptions are not exceptions
in the true sense. In the corporate exception, the suitor must
be a corporation or entity that is sufficiently independent of
the unrecognized government. 9 The de facto exception fo-
cuses on a private claimant enforcing private rights that fall
outside of the scope of national policy. 99 Neither exception al-
lows the unrecognized government itself to maintain suit. I00
E. Transportes: A Statement of Interest Exception?
In Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair,'° ' the court al-
lowed a corporation owned by the People's Republic of Angola
("Transportes") to bring suit in a U.S. court, even though the
executive branch had neither recognized the government nor
established diplomatic relations with it.' °2 The suit was a
breach of contract claim against Ronair, a U.S. corporation.10 3
Transportes proposed four defenses to Ronair's motion to dis-
miss for lack of recognition of the Angolan government. 1°4
The court stated that Transportes may have fulfilled one of the
97. Id. In Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974), the suitor was not an assignee of the unrecog-
nized government, it was an arm of the government, and, therefore, it was not al-
lowed to maintain suit. Id. at 752-53. The court stated that whether a corporate
instrumentality of an unrecognized government could maintain suit is "not so clear."
Upright, 13 A.D.2d at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
98. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 84, 95 and accompanying text.
101. 544 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982).
102. Id. at 863-64; seeJOINT REPORT, supra note 53, at 167 (on U.S.-Angola rela-
tions). For an analysis of this case, see Note, Transportes Aereos de Angola v.
Ronair, Inc.: Nonaccess to U.S. Courts by Unrecognized Governments-A New Exception?, 8
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. TRANSACTIONS 225 (1982-83).
103. Transportes, 544 F. Supp. at 860.
104. The four defenses were:
(I) Recognition is no longer a policy that the State Department practices, and
therefore the judiciary should not base its decisions on the existence of a grant of
recognition.
(2) 28 U.S.C. § 1332 makes no distinction between recognized and unrecog-
nized governments for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
(3) Transportes is a separate and distinct juridical entity and should be allowed
to sue regardless of whether Angola is recognized or not.
(4) The transaction was a commercial transaction, and the Department of Com-
merce approved the transaction by issuing an export license. Id. at 860-61.
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defenses, the separate corporate entity exception, but did not
apply that exception.'0° It relied instead on a State Depart-
ment letter seeking access for Transportes, 10 6 as well as the
fact that the State Department and the Department of Com-
merce had allowed the plane sale to take place and had issued
the license to Transportes for the plane's export.
0 7
The court stated that the purpose of denial of court access
to governments not recognized by the executive is to give full
effect to that branch's sensitive political judgments.'O° The
State Department letter showed that the executive branch had
assessed the transaction and determined that access for Trans-
portes was appropriate.'0 9 By allowing the suit, the court was
giving full effect to executive political judgment.' ' The court
found that an unrecognized government suing on a commer-
cial transaction should be granted court access where the exec-
utive has specifically informed the court that access will not in-
terfere with executive policy.'"
105. Id. at 863.
It may well be that TAAG, although wholly owned by the Angolan govern-
ment, is in fact a discrete and independent entity, which should not be sub-
sumed within its parent government for purposes of this suit. The Court
need not examine this question, however, because it believes that under the
unique facts of this case, there are more compelling reasons why TAAG
should be allowed to pursue its claims in this Court.
Id.
106. Id. The State Department letter stated:
The United States does not maintain, and has never maintained diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of Angola. At the same time, the
United States Government has not discouraged trade between the United
States and Angola. The volume of trade between the two countries in 1980
was $638.6 million, making the United States one of Angola's largest trad-
ing partners .... In these circumstances, the Department of State believes
that allowing access to U.S. courts by the Angolan Airline TAAG, a State-
owned business enterprise, for the resolution of a claim arising out of a
purely commercial transaction, would be consistent with the foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Id. at 861.
107. Id. at 863.
108. Id.; see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
109. Transportes, 544 F. Supp. at 863.
110. Id. at 863-64.
111. Id.
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II. NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL CO. OF IRAN v. THE
M/T STOLT SHEAF. PERMITTING SUIT BY AN
UNRECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN
The Court of Appeals in
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf 1 2 held
that the unrecognized Iranian government may have access to
U.S. courts. 13 The court held that an aggregate of contacts
between the United States and Iran evidenced a strong
suggestion of an implicit willingness on the part of the
executive branch to allow Iran to bring suit." 4 The aggregate
contacts examined by the court, when coupled with the
executive branch Statement of Interest, required the granting
of court access.' 15
A. Background of United States-Iranian Recognition Controversy
During 1978, the Iranian government of Shah Reza Pah-
lavi was beset by numerous uprisings and demonstrations by
the followers of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini." 6
As a result of the political unrest, the Shah left Iran on January
16, 1979, leaving a government of his choosing in control.'
On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran." 8 By February 11,
Khomeini and his followers had ousted the Shah's govern-
ment, placing Mehdi Bazargan in office as the new Prime Min-
ister. I'" President Carter, in a news conference immediately
following the rise of the new government, spoke of the hope
112. 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir., 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
113. Id. at 556.
114. Id. at 555.
115. Id. The Statement of Interest was filed by the executive branch pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 517 (1982), which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States
to attend to the interests of the United States in any pending suit.
116. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG.,
IST SESS., CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-1979, at 73-74 (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY]; A Chronology of Major Events in Iranian
Turmoil, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1979, at A12, col. 1 [hereinafter Chronology].
117. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 116, at 73; B. RUBIN, PAVED
WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND IRAN 242 (1980); Chronology,
supra note 116, col. 2.
118. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 116, at 74; B. RUBIN, supra note
117, at 248; Chronology, supra note 116, col. 3.
119. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 116, at 74; B. RUBIN, supra note
117, at 242, 251; Markham, Anarchy Widespread, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at AI, col.
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for cooperation with the Bazargan regime, 20 but did not make
a formal statement of recognition. The State Department later
explained that the changes in the Iranian government did not
affect the formal recognition of Iran.' 2 ' In subsequent state-
ments, State Department officials indicated the intent to main-
tain diplomatic relations with and recognition of the Bazargan
government. 22 On November 6, 1979, the Bazargan govern-
ment dissolved itself, conceding power to the Ayatollah
Khomeini. 2 3 While the United States did not formally recog-
nize the new government it did attempt to negotiate indirectly
with the new government, with little Success.124
On April 7, 1980, as a result of the Iranian government's
failure to take measures to release the U.S. citizens being held
hostage in Iran, 25 President Carter severed diplomatic rela-
120. B. RUBIN, supra note 117, at 282; Transcript of the President's News Conference of
Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at A14, col. 1. The President
stated that he believed "the people of Iran and their Government will continue to be
our friends .... Id.
121. Smith, Carter Says He's Prepared to Work with Teheran Leaders for Stability, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at Al, cols. 4-5. "[The President] did not specifically recognize
the new government-the State Department explained later that the formal -ecogni-
tion of Iran was unaffected by the change in government-but he said it was the
American intention to 'honor the will of the Iranian people.' " Id. col. 5.
122. The State Department press spokesman, Hodding Carter III, stated that
"[o]ur Ambassador has relayed to the Government in Iran our intention to maintain
diplomatic relations with that Government. This is the formal declaration that our
relations do continue .... We recognize that Government." Brief for Amicus Curiae
the United States of America at 9, National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The
M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989) (quot-
ing AM. BANKER, Mar. 1, 1979, at 3; NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1979, at 26; Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 1979, at 1) (press briefing not officially released, but was reported in the
publications listed above); see CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 116, at 74
(Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs characterized U.S. policy
toward new Iranian government as seeking close and friendly ties).
123. See CONGRESS AND FOREIGN PoLIcY, supra note 116, at 74. Bazargan re-
signed and was replaced by a token provisional government. The main forces in the
Iranian government were Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council, and the militants
holding the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. Id.; B. RUBIN, supra note 117, at 299, 310;
Kifner, Iran's Civil Government Out; Hostages Face Death Threat; Oil Exports Believed Halted,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1979, at Al, col. 8.
124. See generally B. RUBIN, supra note 117, at 300-36 (examining U.S.-Iranian
relations following fall of Bazargan and rise of Revolutionary Council).
125. On November 1, 1979, Khomeini appealed to Iranian students to take ac-
tion against the United States. On November 4, 1979, the U.S. embassy was seized
and 100 U.S. citizens and embassy workers were taken hostage. See CONGRESS AND
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 116, at 74; B. RUBIN, Supra note 117, at 298, 328-29.
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tions with Iran.' 26 Trade restrictions were instituted, Iranian
diplomats were expelled from the United States, and visas is-
sued to Iranians were invalidated.' 27 The case of National Pe-
trochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf 28 arose as a result
of Iranian attempts to skirt the U.S. trade restrictions. 29
B. The District Court
National Petrochemical Company of Iran ("NPC") com-
menced its action to recover losses incurred in an attempt to
ship chemicals from the United States to Iran, via middlemen,
in violation of the U.S. trade embargo. 3 ° The chemicals were
purchased in the United States by a Geneva affiliate of a
Hamburg company.' 3 ' The chartered Liberian ship, M/T Stolt
Sheaf, was to deliver the chemicals to Iran via Spain.' 32 After
war broke out between Iran and Iraq, however, the goods were
diverted and resold in Taiwan.' 33 After filing suit unsuccess-
fully in Hamburg and Rotterdam, NPC filed suit in the United
States.134 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the plaintiff was an entity of the government of
126. See B. RUBIN, supra note 117, at 330; Transcript of Carter Statement on Iran,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1980, at Al, col. 2. "'I have today ordered the following steps:
First, the United States of America is breaking diplomatic relations with the Govern-
ment of Iran.' " Id. at col. 2-3.
127. Transcript of Carter Statement on Iran, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
128. 671 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), revd, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
129. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
552 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989). The executive branch re-
sponse to the hostage crisis resulted in broad trade restrictions. See Exec. Order No.
12,211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 149 (1982) (prohibiting
direct or indirect import of goods or services from Iran into United States, except for
material imported for news publication or broadcast); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3
C.F.R. 248 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 148 (1982) (prohibiting sale, sup-
ply, or other transfer by person within U.S. jurisdiction, of any items, commodities,
or products, except food, medicine, medical supplies, and clothing for the relief of
human suffering, to or for the use of Iran); Proclamation No. 4702, 3 C.F.R. 82
(1980) (prohibiting import into United States of crude oil from Iran); Exec. Order
No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 148 (1982) (blocking
all property and interests in property of the government of Iran and its instrumentali-
ties and entities that are or become subject to U.S. jurisdiction).
130. The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 552.
131. Id. The shipping documents were apparently fabricated to conceal the ori-
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Iran and, as such, unable to sue in U.S. courts, because the
executive branch had not recognized the Khomeini regime.' 35
The court reviewed the principle that only recognized
governments with which the United States is at peace may
bring suit in U.S. courts.' 36 Additionally, the court stated that
deference must be given to the executive branch in determin-
ing which governments may sue.'1 7 The court stated it was un-
disputed that the Khomeini regime was not recognized at that
time by the executive branch. 138 The court based its finding on
a letter from the State Department filed in an unrelated Iranian
action. 39 The letter stated that the United States had not for-
mally recognized the Khomeini regime and had severed diplo-
matic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980.140 The court held
that nonrecognition mandates that the suit be dismissed with
prejudice.' 4 ' Moreover, the court found that NPC was a gov-
135. National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 671 F.
Supp. 1009, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
136. Id.; see supra notes 6-7.
137. The M/TStolt Sheaf, 671 F. Supp. at 1010; seesupra notes 6-12 and accom-
panying text.
138. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 671 F. Supp. at 1010. The Bazargan government fell
in early November 1979, conceding power to Khomeini. See Kifner, supra note 123.
The Revolutionary Council then prepared an Islamic constitution, and elections were
held in which Finance Minister Bani-Sadr was elected the first President of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran. See B. RuBIN, supra note 117, at 373-75.
139. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 671 F. Supp. at 1010. The letter was filed in Iran
Handicraft & Carpet Export Center v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
140. The M/TStolt Sheaf, 671 F. Supp. at 1010 (quoting Letter from U.S. Dep't
of State to Ralph A. Matalan, Esq. (Dec. 26, 1985), reprinted in Iran Handicraft &
Carpet Export Center v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 n.4 (1987)).
The text of the letter stated:
In response to your letter of December 13, 1985, the questions you
posed and the answers of the State Department are as follows:
"1. Has the United States recognized the Khomeini government of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran?"
Answer: No
"2. Did the United States sever diplomatic relations with Iran? If so, on
what date were they served [sic], and have they been re-established since
that date?"
Answer: Diplomatic relations with Iran were severed by the United States
on April 7, 1980, and have not been re-established.
Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Center v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275,
1280 n.4 (1987).
141. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 671 F. Supp. at 1010 (citing Vietnam v. Pfizer, 556
F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977)); see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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ernment agency performing a function for the Iranian govern-
ment and, therefore, was not a separate juridical entity. 14 2
C. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, the U.S. State and Justice Departments filed a
joint brief as amicus curiae in support of Iran's right to sue.' 43
In the brief, the executive branch argued that it had substan-
tially discontinued the practice of extending formal recogni-
tion to new governments. 144 As a result, the executive branch
reasoned that a new government is implicitly recognized where
the U.S. government is silent.' 45 Rather than seek a statement
of formal recognition, the executive branch argued that the
court should inquire whether the executive branch has ex-
pressed an intent to derecognize the Iranian government."16
Absent such intent to derecognize, the brief stated, it is estab-
lished policy that a break in diplomatic relations, as occurred
with Iran, does not bar access to U.S. courts."' 7
The court stated that NPC and amicus conceded that the
President never formally recognized the Khomeini govern-
ment. 48 However, amicus curiae and NPC claimed that the
142. The MIT Stolt Sheaf 671 F. Supp. at 1010. For a discussion of the separatejuridi-
cal entity exception, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
143. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
553 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989). The brief was filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to
attend to the interests of the United States in any pending suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 517
(1982).
144. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America at 11, National Pe-
trochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989) [hereinafter Brief for Amicus].
145. Id. at 12-13.
146. Id. at 17.
147. Id. at 17-18.
[W]hile no formal statement regarding "recognition" has issued from the
Executive Branch with regard to the current government of Iran, Executive
Branch officials explicitly recognized the first government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran and have not explicitly or implicitly derecognized subsequent
governments. The maintenance of litigation by the government of Iran in
our courts is therefore consistent with the prior actions of the Executive.
Id.
148. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
554 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989). The court did review several
well-established rules in the area of recognition. Id. at 553-54. The court stated that
a foreign government must be recognized by the United States in order to take ad-
vantage of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 553. The court stated that the determination
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absence of formal recognition is not dispositive of a govern-
ment's access to U.S. courts, and the executive may recognize a
government for purposes of bringing suit without any formal
recognition of that government. 49  The M/T Stolt Sheaf
claimed that formal recognition is necessary in order to main-
tain suit.' 5 ° The court conceded that language in the Supreme
Court decisions of Sabbatino and Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States arguably support allowing suit only where the govern-
ment is recognized,' 5' but stated that the absence of formal
recognition did not bar access to U.S. courts for NPC.' 52
The court based its decision on two factors. First, the
court noted that the formal recognition policy of the United
States had altered.' 53 The court stated that the State Depart-
ment refrains from announcing recognition of new govern-
ments, because such announcements have been misinterpreted
as statements of approval of those new governments. 154 As a
result of this shift away from formal recognition, the court
stated that recognition alone could not be the basis for deter-
mining a government's right to court access.'
55
The second reason behind the court's decision was that
the power to deal with foreign governments outside of formal
recognition is an essential element of the President's implied
of recognition is left to the executive branch. Id. The court stated that such recogni-
tion is voluntary, but once it is granted, it is not removed until a new regime is recog-
nized as the legitimate government of that state. Id. But see Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc.,
556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977) (no new government of State of Vietnam was recog-
nized by the United States upon fall of recognized government). Finally, the court
noted that a break in diplomatic relations with a recognized government does not
automatically result in denial of court access. The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 553-
54.
149. The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 553-54.
150. Id. at 554.
151. Id. " '[Tihe refusal to recognize has a unique legal aspect. It signifies this
country's unwillingness to acknowledge that the government in question speaks...
for the territory it purports to control.' " Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)). " '[I]n conformity to generally accepted prin-
ciples, the Soviet Government could not maintain a suit in our courts before its rec-
ognition by the political department of the Government.' " Id. (quoting Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938)).
152. Id. at 554.
153. Id. (quoting 77 DEP'T ST. BULL. 462-63 (1977)); see supra note 3. One com-
mentator claims recognition is merely used as a political tool, and it is ineffective and
should be eliminated. L. GALLOWAY, supra note 6, at 152-53.
154. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 554.
155. Id.
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powers in the area of international relations. 156 The President
must have the ability to permit access to U.S. courts, even to
unrecognized governments, because the President alone has
charge of foreign affairs. 157 The court found the situation be-
tween Iran and the United States to be a compelling example
of why the President must have such powers, in view of the
fluctuating relations between the two countries.1
58
Once the court determined formal recognition was not a
prerequisite to maintaining suit, it next looked for signs of ex-
ecutive branch willingness to permit Iran to litigate.' 59 The
court looked to the Algiers Accords, 60 entered into to resolve
the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis;' 6 ' the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 6 2 set up to adjudicate U.S.-Iranian dis-
putes;163 and the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
156. Id. at 554-55; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
157. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555.
158. Id.
This case serves as an excellent example [of why the President alone
must have charge of foreign affairs]. Relations between the United States
and Iran over the past eight years have been less than friendly. Yet, the
status of that relationship has not been unchanging. There have been peri-
ods of improvement, for example, release of the embassy hostages, and pe-
riods of worsening relations, most recently occasioned by the unfortunate
downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes. It is evident
that in today's topsy-turvy world governments can topple and relationships
can change in a moment. The Executive Branch must therefore have broad,




160. The Algiers Accords include the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Pop-
ular Republic of AlgeriaJan. 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter
Algiers Accords], repinted in 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981).
161. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555. The Algiers Accords were entered
into to seek a resolution to the detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran.
See Algiers Accords, supra note 160.
162. Algiers Accords, supra note 160, at 3, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 230.
163. Id.; see The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555. The Claims Tribunal was
established because of the existence of judicial attachments on Iranian assets in the
United States, preventing the return of assets to Iran even in the event of the Execu-
tive lifting the freeze on Iranian assets. Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1984).
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Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, 164 which
the court stated was still in full force and effect.' 65 The court
conceded that none of these factors standing alone would nec-
essarily be enough of a showing of executive willingness to al-
low Iran to proceed as a plaintiff, but considered in the aggre-
gate, the contacts form a strong suggestion that the executive
has shown an implicit willingness to allow the Iranian govern-
ment to bring suit in a U.S. court. 166
The court did not, however, base its decision solely on the
aggregate theory. Instead, the Statement of Interest filed by
the State and Justice Departments was relied upon by the court
as additional proof of executive branch intentions. 67 The
Statement of Interest stated that the Iranian government and
NPC, as its instrumentality, should be afforded access to U.S.
courts for the purpose of resolution of this action.'68 The
court stated that the decision to allow suit was not arbitrary
and the court was not allowing some suits by the unrecognized
Iranian government while not allowing other suits by that gov-
ernment. 6 9 The court stated that the executive did not act ar-
bitrarily when it expressly sought access for Iran after entering
into treaties with that country and establishing the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal. 7 0
Thus, the court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf allowed the unrec-
164. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the
United States of America and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
165. The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555.
166. Id. "Considering these factors in the aggregate, and not in isolation, as
integral components of the United States overall relationship to Iran, the above re-
cited connections strongly suggest that the Executive Branch has evinced an implicit
willingness to permit the government of Iran to avail itself of a federal forum." Id.
167. Id. In Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc.,
No. CV 87-03673 RG (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1988), the State Department also filed a
Statement of Interest on behalf of Iran. In that action, the Iranian Defense Ministry
was suing on an award of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which the defend-
ant refused to pay. The Gould court held that the Statement of Interest was an une-
quivocal request for Iranian court access, and the Supreme Court, in Pfizer v. Gov-
ernment of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), stated that it is the exclusive power of the
Executive Branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue in this country.
Gould, at 3-4.
168. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555; see also Brief for Amicus, supra note
144, at 19.
169. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555-56.
170. Id. "[Als the sole branch authorized to conduct relations with foreign
countries, the Executive clearly did not act arbitrarily." Id. at 556.
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ognized government of Iran to maintain suit in a U.S. court on
the basis of an aggregate of contacts and a Statement of Inter-
est from the executive branch.' 7 1 In doing so, the court stated
it was effectuating executive policy by deferring to executive
action. 172
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE M/T STOLT SHEAF
The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf allowed Iran to bring
suit in a U.S. court on the basis of an aggregate of factors and a
Statement of Interest. 73 An aggregate test removes the pro-
cess of recognition from the executive branch and allows the
judiciary to determine when recognition has occurred. When a
government has not been recognized, an executive branch
Statement of Interest is the appropriate method of determin-
ing executive branch policy, as it provides an unquestionable
statement of that policy. 74
A. The Problem with an Aggregate Factors Test
The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf looked at various con-
tacts of the United States with Iran and, on the basis of these
contacts, found a strong willingness of the executive branch to
allow Iran to sue in a U.S. court. 175 The use of such an aggre-
gate factors test is a novel approach in the area of access to
U.S. courts for unrecognized governments. Past cases de-
ferred to the executive on the issue of recognition and court
access, but the intentions of the executive were ascertained by
an explicit grant or withholding of recognition by the executive
branch. 76 The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf suggests that will-
171. See id. at 555.
172. Id. at 555-56.
173. Id. at 555.
174. See Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, 544 F. Supp. 858, 863-64 (D.
Del. 1982).
175. The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555.
176. See, e.g., Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977) (unrecognized
government of Socialist Republic of Vietnam cannot maintain suit in U.S. court);
Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub
nor. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974) (East German government, not recognized by executive
branch, could not sue in U.S. court); The Penza, 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) (executive
branch refusal to recognize Soviet government precluding suit by that government in
U.S. court); The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1920) (executive branch refusal to
recognize Soviet government precluding suit by that government in U.S. court); Rus-
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ingness to allow suit may be developed by assessing relations
between the United States and the unrecognized government
instead of deferring to the executive.' 77 This process of deter-
mining court access does not comply with the established prin-
ciples of court access to unrecognized governments as set forth
in the Sabbatino or Transportes decisions.' 78 In Sabbatino, the
court stated that it could not assess the level of relations that
the United States has with a foreign government. 79 In Trans-
portes the court looked solely to the executive Statement of In-
terest to ascertain the executive branch's willingness to allow
Angola to bring suit.' 80
The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf, in order to give full
effect to executive branch determinations, should have relied
solely on the executive branch Statement of Interest and not
considered the applicability of arbitrary contacts with the Ira-
nian government in allowing court access for that government.
The proposition of an aggregate contacts test puts the deter-
mination of whether recognition has been granted in the hands
of the court instead of the executive branch.' 8 ' Established
policy,' though, leaves the method of determining recognition,
as well as the actual act of recognition, to the executive
branch. 8 2 The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf itself discussed
the importance of the need for executive branch freedom to
sian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259
(1923) (executive branch refusal to recognize Soviet government precluding suit by
that government in U.S. court). But see Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, 544
F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982) (unrecognized government of Angola allowed to main-
tain suit on commercial transaction in U.S. court).
177. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555. For an analysis suggesting that
courts should be free to undertake independent analysis of relations with a foreign
government in order to determine U.S. court access, regardless of executive policy or
even State Department objections (with limited exceptions for rebuttal by the execu-
tive), see Note, Out from the Precarious Orbit of Politics: Reconsidering Recognition and the
Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S. Courts, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 473 (1989).
178. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398, 410 (1964) (courts
cannot assess level of friendliness or unfriendliness of relations with another coun-
try); Transportes, 544 F. Supp. at 863-64 (Angolan government has access to U.S.
courts where executive branch specifically requested such access).
179. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410.
180. Transportes, 544 F. Supp. at 864.
181. Such action goes against the policy of recognition as an executive branch
decision. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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deal with foreign powers. 83 The court stated that the execu-
tive branch must have the latitude to permit court access to
unrecognized foreign governments.'8 4 Using an aggregate
test, a court could extend access to an unrecognized foreign
government based on the court's assessment of executive
branch contacts with that government, rather than relying on a
formal statement of the executive branch. 85
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'8 6 the Court modi-
fied the traditional policy as to suits by recognized govern-
ments.' 87 The Court in Sabbatino stated that comity had been
equated with friendly relations between states, but in practice
court access had not been denied except to unrecognized gov-
ernments and those with which the United States was at war.' 88
Sabbatino, in examining the effect of a break in diplomatic rela-
tions, distinguished between friendship and comity." 9 The
Court stated that comity does not require the existence of
friendship between nations. 90 Suit depends not on friendship
as evidenced by the existence of diplomatic relations, but on
an executive branch grant of recognition, regardless of the
state of diplomatic relations."'
Iran does not fit into the modified view espoused in Sabba-
tino, because the Bazargan government was formally recog-
nized by the executive branch, but the subsequent Khomeini
regimes were not.'9 2 The executive branch chose not to recog-
nize the current Khomeini regime because of important for-
eign policy reasons. Factors such as the hostage situation, the
183. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stoll Sheaf, 860 F.2d 553,
554-55 (2d. Cir. 1988), cerl. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
184. Id. at 555.
185. The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf denies that there is any arbitrariness in
assessing contacts of the United States with a foreign nation. Id. at 555-56. One
commentator stated that "granting of recognition is traditionally and appropriately
an instrument of foreign policy that the Executive Branch is entitled to wield."
Parloff, 2nd Circuit Permits Iran to Sue Shipper in U.S., Manhattan Law., Nov. 15-21,
1988, at 33. The commentator stated that there was "some innovation" in the gov-
ernment claiming that it could grant access in individual instances without regard to
general inferences of recognition. Id.
186. 376 U.S 398 (1964).
187. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
188. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409.
189. Id. at 409-10.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 410.
192. See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
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strong anti-U.S. sentiment espoused by the Khomeini govern-
ment, the prevailing opinion of the U.S. public, and the diffi-
culty in negotiating with the Iranian government all played a
role in the executive branch decision to withhold recogni-
tion. "'9 3 Formal recognition is no longer granted in all cases
where new governments come into power.'9 4 Instead, the ex-
ecutive either does or does not continue relations with a new
government. 95 This shift results from formal recognition
grants, appearing to imply U.S. approval of newly-recognized
governments. 196 The shift away from formal recognition,
though, does not vest the courts with the power to determine
what foreign governments may maintain suit. 1 7
The recognition of a government, by whatever method, is
an executive function.' 98 If courts are left to examine foreign
relations in order to determine what level of contacts exist, the
executive's constitutionally delegated power is diminished.' 99
An aggregate factors test equates the existence of a certain
gray area of contacts with a U.S. government intent to recog-
nize. This is contrary to past policy and to the Sabbatino deci-
sion. The Court in Sabbatino specifically stated that there is no
connection between diplomatic relations and court access.2 °0
To consider U.S. contacts with a foreign government as the
basis for standing in U.S. courts has the same effect as stating
that the existence of diplomatic relations is determinative of
court access. The aggregate test suggests that court access can
be based on an assessment of diplomatic relations, and in do-
ing so it ignores the Supreme Court's rejection of such a test.
B. Statement of Interest
The court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf did not follow the policy
of deference to the executive Statement of Interest set out by
the court in Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair.20 1 Such a pol-
193. See generally B. RUBIN, supra note 117, at 300-30.
194. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Such a decision is reserved for the executive branch. See supra notes 6-12
and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
199. On the executive's constitutional powers, see supra notes 6-9.
200. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1964).
201. 544 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982).
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icy ensures that there will be no mistake by the court as to ex-
ecutive intent. In Transportes, the court reasoned that the exec-
utive branch policy was clearly expressed by a letter to the
court requesting access for the Angolan government.2 02 The
court, granted access to an unrecognized government on the
basis of an explicit executive branch request. 203 Such a request
is not the same as the court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf reviewing,
on its own, executive branch actions to determine implied ex-
ecutive branch policy. Executive branch intent was as clear in
Transportes as it was in The M/T Stolt Sheaf through the State-
ment of Interest. The court should have ruled solely on the
Statement of Interest rather than examining the executive
branch's contacts with the foreign government.20 4 Such action
is not in conformity with the Transportes rationale. The court
cannot give full effect to the executive branch's sensitive polit-
ical judgment by assessing various contacts with an unrecog-
nized government.
The court in The M/T.Stolt Sheaf refers to the need for
broad executive powers in foreign relations.2 0 5 To effectuate
these powers, courts should not decide how friendly or un-
friendly a foreign government's relations with the United
States are at any given moment.2 0' 6 The aggregate factors test
proposed by the court in The M/T Stolt Sheaf, though, would
vest courts with foreign affairs powers.20 7 Such a practice is
vague and may lead to conflicting results in different courts as
to the right of access of the same government. Where unrec-
ognized foreign governments bring suit, the courts should
look to the executive branch for a Statement of Interest. 20 8 If
the executive branch permits suit, it will not interfere with ex-
202. Id. at 863.
203. Id.
204. In The MI/T Stolt Sheaf, the court considered contacts that were not related
in any way to the issue of court access. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The
M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 553 (2d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989); see
supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
205. See The MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d at 555-56.
206. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398, 410 (1964).
207. Conduct of foreign affairs is an executive function. See supra notes 6-10 and
accompanying text.
208. See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., No.
CV 87-03673 RG (C.D. Cal.jan. 14, 1988); Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair,
544 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1982).
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ecutive policy.20 9 If the executive branch denies access, how-
ever, executive policy will likewise be effectuated.21 ° In either
instance the courts will not be assuming an executive branch
function by making an arbitrary cataloguing of the relative
value of a country's relations with the United States.
CONCLUSION
The decision in The M/T Stolt Sheaf suggests that the rec-
ognition of a foreign government may be determined by the
courts in the absence of a formal executive statement. Formal
recognition, however, is an executive function and should be
left to the executive branch. In the absence of a clear state-
ment of recognition by the executive branch, the courts should
seek a Statement of Interest from the executive branch to de-
termine whether executive policy would be served by allowing
an unrecognized government to bring suit in U.S. courts. To
allow courts to determine such access may result in the conflict
of executive and judicial actions, which the traditional policy of
deference to the executive branch is meant to avoid.
Jonas E. Herbsman*
209. Id. The Restatement Third states that, presumably, the President in withhold-
ing recognition of a regime, might decide that such denial should not preclude access
to the courts. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 3, § 205 comment a. This view sup-
ports a policy whereby the President is in charge of recognition decisions. A case-by-
case determination by the President of court access for unrecognized governments
would enable courts to function in such instances while at the same time avoiding
court-implied. recognition.
210. See Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977); Federal Republic
of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub noa. Kunstsam-
mlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974).
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